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"THE WORST FLOODS IN HISTORY" 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE FLOODS OF 1944 
IN THE ELKHORN RIVER BASIN 
TODD KERSTETTER 
"Damage by Elkhorn Defies Estimation" 
-Headline in the Fremont (Nebr.) Guide and Tribune, 13 June 1944 
Water has played a critical, even defining, 
role in the history of the American West. Typi-
cally, scarcity determined water's significance. 
Farmers descended of European stock found 
too little water in the West to continue their 
traditional agriculture. Battles linger to this 
day over water rights for irrigation and urban 
usage. In a less-examined phenomenon, excess 
water has shaped the otherwise arid Plains by 
influencing the relationship between humans 
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and their environment. In Nebraska's Elkhorn 
River Basin, a steady history of flooding led 
humans to alter the basin in attempts to con-
trol or mitigate flooding. Record flooding in 
1944 revealed the weaknesses in a series of ad 
hoc flood control measures taken during pre-
vious decades and spurred basin residents to 
recruit federal aid in an effort to control the 
Elkhorn once and for all. Although subsequent 
flood control projects still could not totally 
prevent flooding on the Elkhorn, 1944 marked 
the beginning of a new era in the relationship 
between basin residents and their environ-
ment. This reflected a broader trend in Ameri-
can environmental history, that of bringing 
the phenomenal resources of the federal gov-
ernment to bear upon the countryside. 
The Elkhorn Basin experiences floods regu-
larly, almost annually, to this day. One of the 
earliest written accounts comes from Paul 
Wilhelm, Duke ofWiirttemberg, who recorded 
in August 1823 a hurricane-like storm that 
turned the Elkhorn into a torrent. The river 
flooded Indian earth lodges abandoned for the 
180 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 2001 
summer. When Americans of European de-
scent began settling in the basin in the 1850s, 
they located town sites near the river, the bet-
ter to utilize the Elkhorn's current to power 
mills. Placing economic assets such as mills 
and homes within the river's reach-the flood-
plain, not just the usual banks, must be con-
sidered any river's natural domain-paved the 
way for conflict. During the late 1800s basin 
residents coped with flooding simply by re-
building damaged structures, replanting dam-
aged crops, and, in some areas, as at Norfolk, 
by building levees to protect assets from high 
water. 
The dawn of the twentieth century saw 
people in several counties form drainage dis-
tricts, which were private, quasi-governmen-
tal organizations dedicated to improving 
drainage within their jurisdictions. The 
Elkhorn River Drainage District and the 
Elkhorn Valley Drainage District each pur-
sued "improvements" to the river, typically 
straightening curved portions of the channel 
to facilitate drainage. By 1912 the districts 
had completed several such projects, which 
accomplished their objectives but only during 
rains and floods of limited magnitude. 
Between 1910 and 1920, local flood fight-
ers attacked the basin more aggressively. Work-
ers dredged the Elkhorn's final twenty miles 
and created a new channel. Tributaries such 
as Logan Creek experienced similar modifica-
tions, which in some cases made it impossible 
to recognize the original channel. Logan 
Creek, originally 150 miles long, shrank to 
less than one-half its original length. As a re-
sult of those efforts flood damage declined. 
Piecemeal modifications continued through 
the 1930s. Changes ranged from further dredg-
ing and channel-straightening projects to small 
dams. The basin felt the federal government's 
influence in 1935 as Works Progress Adminis-
tration laborers finished a dam on the Elk-
horn's North Fork at Pierce. The resulting lake 
provided recreational opportunities in addi-
tion to flood control benefits. 
Despite efforts to control the Elkhorn, the 
basin experienced its worst floods ever in 1940. 
During the night of 1 June, a cloudburst 
dumped a foot or more of rain on the north-
central basin. Before the week was out, a sec-
ond storm added more water to the Elkhorn 
and its tributaries. Government agencies rang-
ingfrom the University ofN ebraska to the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration and the 
Works Progress Administration responded to 
the flood crisis, as did the American Red Cross. 
A representative from the US Department of 
Agriculture visited the basin in July to gather 
information about flood damages. Although 
little appears to have been done with the data, 
it foreshadowed similar efforts that would come 
four years later with greater consequences. 
Nonetheless, the first ninety years of perma-
nent European-American settlement in the 
basin witnessed increasingly complex re-
sponses to flooding. People initially acted de-
fensively, building dikes, levees, and floodways 
to halt rising water and to divert it from build-
ings and farmland. Over time, as greater tech-
nology and assets became available, responses 
to flooding became more aggressive. Humans 
altered the river itself as they straightened 
and dredged the channel. By 1940 even those 
more determined efforts failed to protect prop-
erty against what was at that time the worst 
flooding ever recorded on the Elkhorn. When 
devastating floods in 1944 surpassed damage 
records set in 1940, people responded even 
more aggressively and threatened to remake 
the entire basin.! 
April showers made the spring of 1944 an 
especially wet one in the Elkhorn Basin. That 
month saw the beginning of a thirty-day rainy 
spell that saturated soils throughout much of 
the region. Since the destructive flood of 1940, 
three years free of major flooding seemed to 
have helped people put wet basements, flooded 
towns, and washed-out crops out of mind. 
A vailable records indicate residents had done 
little, if anything, to change their relationship 
with the river and its tributaries since the in-
undation of 1940. After all, a congressional 
report issued ten years earlier deemed the 
Elkhorn unworthy of federal flood control 
measures because it was neither navigable nor 
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FIG. 1. Elkhorn River Basin, Nebraska, and 1944 flood sites. Map drawn by Tracy Smith. 
an important producer of hydroelectric power. 
Besides, flooding in the basins of the Platte 
and its tributaries never amounted to much, 
according to the report. Given that back-
ground and the drought of the 1930s, 1944's 
rainy spring probably had residents preparing 
for a typical but unremarkable Elkhorn flood. 
Instead, they got two exceptional floods. The 
runoff from two severe rainstorms, exacerbated 
by the wet spring and saturated soils, produced 
a pair of floods that would prod the govern-
ment to change its stereotype of the region 
and change how the basin's residents inter-
acted with the river,z 
On Wednesday, 10 May 1944, rain clouds 
over the west-central Elkhorn Basin dimmed 
the afternoon sun. The large storm covered 
portions of eastern Nebraska and parts ofIowa, 
South Dakota, and Minnesota. Rains soaked 
the upper Elkhorn Basin for nearly two and a 
half hours . The rains came again on Thursday, 
drenching the same areas. Ten inches of rain 
fell at the storm's worst. 
Much of the water went overland in an 
abnormally high runoff toward streams and 
rivers. All streams draining the area registered 
high stages after the storm, and the North 
Fork flooded. Livestock farmers reported pigs, 
hogs, and sheep drowning in the flood. Crop 
growers were more fortunate. Because the 
waters receded within two days, the flood dam-
aged only limited amounts of the small grains 
and alfalfa planted on bottomland. 3 
The flood hit the city of Norfolk at about 
2:30 A.M. when a two-and-a-half-foot tall wall 
of water from the Elkhorn's North Fork broke 
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FIG. 2. Large pieces of ice on Highway 32 going west from West Point, Nebraska, in 1960 flood. Ice was left 
when flood waters dropped after covering west end of town. Flood stage was 16.09 feet at the river bridge-3 .09 feet 
over flood stage. Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society. Photograph by William Reinsch, Soil 
Conservation Service. 
over the city's dikes and headed for a dance 
hall. The flood wave wrenched the 144-foot 
by 87 -foot building from its foundation and 
carried it intact to the bridge over the North 
Fork at Third Street and Elm A venue. Ac-
cording to the owner, previous floods had risen 
slowly and held to the river's course. The flood 
washed out five area highway bridges by Sat-
urday, 13 May.4 
Once out of its banks, the stream flooded 
an estimated 861 acres in and around Norfolk 
to depths reaching four feet. 5 The water 
reached two to three feet higher than the pre-
vious high water mark in the city, transform-
ing the area into a giant lake. While the North 
Fork flooded the city from the north and east, 
the Elkhorn rose from its banks to flood the 
city's south side. Cresting at one and a half 
feet above flood stage late on Friday, 12 May, 
or early on Saturday 13 May, the Elkhorn drove 
people from their south-side homes as it 
reached as far west as Second Street. 
Receding waters revealed the flood's handi-
work. The business district and a large resi-
dential area-176 city blocks total-were hit 
by the waters of either the Elkhorn or the 
North Fork. High water damaged 177 busi-
nesses and 459 homes and forced between 300 
and 400 people to leave their homes, about 
100 of them by boat. The flood interrupted 
telephone, power, and railroad services and 
left a heavy deposit of mud and slime. 
Commercial losses included disrupted rail 
service, lost inventory, and grocers suffered 
from an embargo placed upon the sale of any 
goods touched by flood waters-an effort to 
prevent an epidemic of floodborne diseases. 
Vegetables normally eaten raw, such as let-
tuce, were to be destroyed. So, too, were 
canned and bottled goods. Authorities filed 
charges on Monday, 15 May, against a mer-
chant who sold contaminated bottled and 
canned goods. Other food, such as corn or 
beans, that would be boiled before consump-
tion were exempt from the embargo. Mer-
chants who sold goods other than food lost 
business as they closed for up to ten days to 
clean debris from their flooded stores. 6 
Although the May flood surpassed previ-
ous marks in the upper basin, where old-tim-
ers said water reached about a foot higher than 
the previous high water mark, the lower basin 
also felt the flood's effects. It hit West Point 
on Sunday, 14 May. Early that morning the 
Elkhorn began rising at about six inches per 
hour as it reached into the city park and 
Cuming County fairgrounds. The high water, 
which reached within eighteen inches of the 
record height set by the 1940 flood in West 
Point, disrupted traffic on Highway 275 and 
caused delays in rail traffic for several days. 7 
One month to the day after the May storm 
hit, rains again drenched eastern Nebraska and 
parts of southeastern South Dakota, western 
Iowa, Kansas, and Minnesota. A heavy thun-
derstorm centered over the headwaters of 
Maple and Pebble Creeks in the lower Elkhorn 
Basin dumped as much as fifteen inches of 
rain. Within six hours, an average of twelve 
inches of precipitation fell at the storm's cen-
ter. 8 
As in May, soils could not absorb the runoff 
produced by the intense storm. The swollen 
Elkhorn covered an area about fifty miles long 
by twenty miles wide in the lower basin. Tribu-
tary flooding inundated an additional 61,000 
acres. A gauging station recorded a peak four 
times the station's previous record high. The 
surging Elkhorn raised the Platte River to flood 
stage from its confluence with the Elkhorn to 
its mouth and added enough water to a mod-
erately high Missouri River to cause severe 
flooding from the mouth of the Platte to St. 
Joseph, Missouri. With early flood damage 
estimates for the basin reaching into the mil-
lions of dollars, residents in the lower basin 
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called the June 1944 flood the "worst flood in 
history."9 
As the flood receded, increasingly accurate 
damage reports became available. A Red Cross 
survey in Dodge County placed primary blame 
on the Elkhorn for floods that hit 92,480 of 
Dodge County's 341,779 acres-slightly less 
than 27 percent of the county's area. That 
land held about 25 percent of the county's 
corn crop. The flood destroyed seven homes, 
damaged 743 more, and destroyed 121 barns 
and outbuildings, damaging another 354. The 
flood wrecked 1,500 miles offencing, twenty-
five pieces offarm machinery, and 1,000 addi-
tional pieces of farm machinery were damaged. 
Almost 161 businesses, churches, and schools 
also sustained flood damage. Livestock also 
suffered heavily. Estimates placed Dodge 
County's losses at fifteen horses and mules, 
456 head of cattle, 1,800 hogs and pigs, 225 
sheep, and 120,000 poultry. Receding flood-
waters scattered thousands of animal corpses, 
so not only their loss but also their disposal 
added to the flood's costs. IO 
Amid the death and destruction, some fauna 
thrived in the flood's aftermath. Seedcorn 
beetles, which feed on the hearts of seedcorn 
kernels, multiplied in the moist conditions. 
Infestation reports first surfaced about ten days 
after the flood. A farmer who planted fifty 
acres of corn one Thursday evening lost most 
of that field to the beetles by the following 
morning. Extension agents urged farmers to 
pack the soil firmly in their cornfields to dis-
courage the burrowing pests. In addition to 
obvious damage, this kind of collateral dam-
~ge escalated the flood's impact on the ba-
sinY 
Nebraskans outside the basin also felt the 
effects of the flood when they tried to use its 
transportation networks. Fremont, separated 
from Omaha by the Elkhorn, could rely on 
only one road, Highway 77, to carry traffic out 
of the city, and no trains entered or left on the 
morning of 12 June. The June freshet disrupted 
service on the Chicago and Northwestern 
Railroad in the basin. Repair crews would need 
two weeks to restore most service, although 
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FIG. 3. The Elkhorn River flood damage on the]. L. Blair property, seven miles northwest of Battle Creek, 
Madison County, Nebraska, in March 1960 flood. Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society. Photography 
by V. Van, Soil Conservation Service. 
disruptions lingered for months on some 
lines. 12 
Human psyches suffered, too. Robert Leisy, 
a sixty-one-year-old farmer whose land south 
of Wisner flooded inJune, shot and killed him-
self on the 14th of that month. Although im-
possible to attribute directly to the flood, it 
was speculated that, with all of the other prob-
lems in his life, the damage to his farm by the 
flood may have provided the proverbial "last 
straw" that led him to take his life.13 
The massive, varied devastation wrought 
by 1944's record-breaking flood elicited the 
most comprehensive and concerted responses 
from residents, government agencies, and 
charitable organizations yet. Within ten days 
of the May flood, the Norfolk Drainage Board, 
acting on orders from the Corps of Engineers, 
began repairs on the dike ruptured on 12 May. 
The Red Cross fed, clothed, and housed fami-
lies flooded from their homes. While still com-
pleting relief work from the May flood, the 
Red Cross aided victims of the June flood. At 
its Fremont headquarters, the Red Cross daily 
prepared 4,500 meals, which it distributed to 
relief centers in the basin. Units of the Ne-
braska National Guard rushed into the field 
shortly after the flood hit on Sunday, June 14. 
Other civic groups such as the American Le-
gion and Auxiliary and fire departments also 
joined the relief effort. One village, Hooper, 
organized an impromptu "lost and found" on 
an empty lot. Authorities encouraged people 
to bring items that had washed onto their prop-
erty to the lot where, authorities hoped, the 
owners would claim them. 14 At the county 
level, officials juggled budgets and raised taxes 
to pour money into road and bridge repairs. 
The state aided flooded farmers by suggesting 
replanting strategies and canvassing the state 
to obtain seed. Federal government responses 
included a flood warning system courtesy of 
the US Weather Bureau. 15 
The most important federal response, how-
ever, came in reassessing its evaluation of the 
Elkhorn Basin. Led by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, a number of local, state, and fed-
eral agencies, in cooperation with residents, 
researched and analyzed flooding and flood 
damage in the Elkhorn Basin. Washington's 
view of the basin had taken shape during the 
late 1920s. In the 308 Report on the Platte 
River-one of about 200 such reports on US 
streams prepared as called for in the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1927-the government 
concluded the Platte Basin, including the 
Elkhorn, did not suffer destructive flooding. 
Although the Flood Control Act of 1936 saw 
the government assume responsibility for con-
trolling flooding on rivers, which, when 
flooded menaced national welfare through loss 
of life, erosion, or impaired transportation and 
commerce, the 308 Report caused the govern-
ment to overlook the Elkhorn. 16 The postmor-
tem investigation of the 1944 floods would 
change this assessment. 
The political climate in 1944 also favored 
reviewing the Elkhorn's status. That summer 
found Congress embroiled in the Missouri 
Basin Project, better known as the Pick-Sloan 
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Plan, which called for reclamation and flood 
control projects throughout the Missouri Ba-
sin, which included the Elkhorn. Severe flood-
ing on the Missouri River in 1943 prompted 
the House Flood Control Committee to ask 
the Corps of Engineers to review the Missouri 
River for flood control options. The corps as-
signed Colonel Lewis A. Pick, then division 
engineer of the corps' Missouri River office 
in Omaha, to the task. Pick composed a re-
sponse that employed multiple-purpose dams 
to control flooding and provide possible irri-
gation and power production. This broke with 
the corps' traditional duty of working on navi-
gation projects. W. G. Sloan, an engineer in 
the Department of Interior's Bureau of Recla-
mation, had also been working on a develop-
ment plan for the Missouri. Congress received 
the plans, Pick's emphasizing flood control, 
Sloan's emphasizing irrigation and hydro-
electric power production, in February and 
May 1944, respectively. As the Elkhorn 
flooded in 1944, Congress studied the two 
plans, which it would eventually fuseY The 
time seemed ripe to produce a new relation-
ship between the Elkhorn and the people liv-
ing in its basin. 
On 21 June 1944 the House Committee on 
Flood Control ordered a survey of the Elkhorn 
Basin to determine if conditions justified fed-
erally financed flood control measures. Begin-
ning with a pair of flood damage hearings, on 
29 August at Norfolk and on 30 August at 
Fremont, the corps reviewed the conclusions 
of the 308 Report, evaluating the Elkhorn's 
flooding through firsthand consultation with 
local residents. IS 
In preparation for the hearings, several 
towns held organizational meetings to discuss 
the flood's damages and to explore options for 
preventing or limiting future damages by the 
Elkhorn and its tributaries. On 23 June, Hooper 
held one of the earliest such meetings, at-
tended by forty to fifty people representing 
the county extension department, the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration, bankers, 
newspapers, the Red Cross, the Farm Secur-
ity Administration, and the Reconstruction 
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Finance Corporation. The gathering included 
mayors or other city officials of every Dodge 
County town, except North Bend, who met to 
discuss flood issues. 19 With this kind of prepa-
ration, they hoped to make a strong case for 
assistance. 
Testimony at the Norfolk hearing indicated 
flood damages came to more than double the 
damages suffered in the 1940 flood. The 1944 
floods caused especially heavy losses because 
they happened so late in the growing season 
that some farmland had to go unused. In most 
earlier floods, farmers replanted successfully 
after waters receded. Russell Young, a farmer 
from Tilden with thirty-four acres of bottom-
land, testified that it "produces real good ev-
ery year," but that "we never had anything 
this year at all." Young went on to tell the 
corps that the floods occurred often and "ev-
ery one seems to be getting a little worse." A 
con&ensus of the farmers surveyed for the hear-
ing agreed that floods had been getting pro-
gressively worse during their years on the 
Elkhorn. 20 
Overall, those testifying believed that the 
Elkhorn and its tributaries should be straight-
ened and widened and that reservoirs should 
be built at tributaries' headwaters to slow the 
flow of water into the main stem during flood 
situations. Generally speaking, laymen, mostly 
farmers, advocated local channel modifications 
and levees while those with technical training 
advocated similar responses on a basinwide 
scale. Testimony given the next day in Fre-
mont from lower basin residents echoed that 
of their upstream neighbors. They recom-
mended the corps straighten and widen the 
Elkhorn's channel and build dikes and levees 
to protect low areas. The crowd realized, how-
ever, that it would be virtually impossible to 
prevent a disaster similar to the floods caused 
by the intense flash rains of June 1944. In 
some cases, they acknowledged, nature just 
could not be contained. 21 However, it could, 
perhaps, be managed so that floods would not 
be as devastating. 
Members of the local media agreed. Days 
after the hearings, the Fremont Guide and Tri-
bune editorialized that localized control 
projects were not the answer. Local protec-
tion projects might successfully save one town 
from the ravages of a flood, but that town's 
dikes and levees would merely divert the wa-
ter to another location, which, if left unpro-
tected, would suffer more than it would have 
otherwise. According to the Guide and Tri-
bune, the Elkhorn needed a comprehensive, 
basinwide management plan. 22 
Before engineers began their survey, Con-
gressman Karl Stefan of Norfolk warned his 
constituents that the federal government did 
not have funds available for extensive flood 
control on the Elkhorn. Stefan promised to 
visit the flooded locales with an engineer from 
the corps' Omaha district and that an official 
army survey would be made. From the survey, 
Stefan told members of the West Point Com-
munity Club, individual towns would be able 
to draw suggestions for local flood protection 
projects. But Congress, he told them, had little 
money available except to finance minor con-
struction work such as "a small dike here and 
a bit of revetment there."23 
Nonetheless, the government apparently 
listened to the advice given at the Norfolk 
and Fremont hearings. In the following years, 
the Corps of Engineers surveyed the entire 
basin, conducting an inspection of existing 
protection projects and the sites of all specific 
improvements suggested in testimony at the 
hearings. Portions of the basin, including the 
upper reaches of the Elkhorn, the upper reaches 
of the North Fork, and the upper portions of 
Cedar, Logan, Union, Humbug, Plum, Pebble, 
Maple, Rawhide, and Bell Creeks, merited no 
flood control measures in the eyes of the corps. 
Some of these areas simply did not flood, or 
did not flood often enough or seriously enough 
to warrant expensive modifications. In other 
areas, serious flood damages occurred only 
during the 1944 floods. In some of these places, 
notably in areas whose elevations placed them 
above possible flood damage from streams, 
damages resulted from the intense nature of 
the rainstorms and from overland runoff rather 
than from streams overflowing their banks.24 
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FIG. 4. Bridge across Elkhorn River near J.L. Blair property, 2.5 miles east and 1 mile north of Battle Creek, 
Nebraska, in March 1960 flood. Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society. Photograph by V. Van, Soil 
Conservation Service. 
Using information gathered from the hear-
ings and surveys, the corps drafted four compre-
hensive improvement plans, which included a 
number of local protection projects that could 
be undertaken individually. Comprehensive 
Plan A called for improvements to the Elkhorn 
and its tributaries that would protect against 
floods of the magnitude of a "super flood" 
comparable to the 1944 inundation from 
Neligh to the river's mouth. Levees and chan-
nel modifications would provide the means 
for protection along both the Elkhorn and its 
tributaries. Plan B aimed at flood protection 
along the Elkhorn and its tributaries from 
Norfolk to the river's mouth against floods 
about half the magnitude of the 1944 flood by 
using levees and channel modifications to 
eliminate large and objectionable bends. Es-
sentially the same as Plan A, Plan B would 
merely provide protection against floods of 
lesser magnitude and would not include the 
area from Neligh to Norfolk. Plan C contained 
the same details as Plan A but with the addi-
tion of a flood control reservoir. Plan 0 called 
for a larger, multipurpose reservoir that would 
allow for not only flood control but also for 
hydroelectric power generation and irriga-
tion. 25 
The corps also suggested a series of twelve 
local flood protection projects that could be 
undertaken by cities or towns in partnership 
with the federal government. These projects, 
which were excerpts from the comprehensive 
plans, would allow residents to protect stra-
tegic portions of the floodplain, usually towns, 
and avoid the prohibitive expense of improv-
ing the entire length of the river. Areas rec-
ommended for projects included the North 
Fork at Pierce and Norfolk; Giles, Buffalo, 
Battle, and Meskenthine Creeks; and the 
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Elkhorn at West Point, Scribner, Hooper, 
Winslow, Waterloo, and in an area above the 
river's mouth. Some projects involved levees 
and channel diversions or modifications. For 
example, the town of Pierce would be pro-
tected against floods equal to the magnitude 
of the town's worst flood by a two-mile-long 
levee on the south, east, and north sides of 
town. In addition, about 1,700 feet of the 
North Fork's channel would be enlarged and 
relocated south of the town's park to handle 
flows that would normally overwhelm the ca-
pacity of the Pierce Dam. The dam's spillway 
and downstream channel would also be modi-
fied to improve their drainage abilities. 26 
Most of the local protection projects con-
sisted simply of minimal channel modifica-
tions and levees to be built around cities as a 
bulwark against high water. Such would be 
the case for agricultural areas along the North 
Fork from Pierce to its mouth. The North 
Fork's channel would be widened in places 
and straightened where "objectionable" bends 
constrained flowY 
Some waterways, such as Giles Creek, 
earned more aggressive recommendations from 
the corps. The corps suggested blocking the 
original channel west of Tilden and sending 
Giles into a levee-enclosed diversion channel 
about 9,700 feet long that would empty into 
the Elkhorn. An especially steep gradient 
through the town of Stanton earned Mes-
ken thine Creek, too, a recommendation for 
aggressive treatment from the corps. Since the 
channel's steep fall created the potential for 
flood flows of destructive velocity, the corps 
proposed to line the channel with concrete 
where it flowed through the city and surround 
the concrete channel with six-foot-high 
levees. 28 
While straightening and enlarging the 
channels of the Elkhorn and its tributaries 
found wide support among residents, engineers 
found that implementing such improvements 
basinwide would be economically infeasible. 
In making that decision, the corps relied upon 
estimates of past and future flood damages on 
the Elkhorn and its tributaries. Estimates for 
future damages often exceed estimates of past 
annual damages by multiples. The corps pre-
dicted an increase in the severity of flood dam-
age through an increase in the frequency and 
magnitude of flooding, an increase in flood-
plain development and the attendant higher 
potential for damage, or a combination thereof. 
The figures show that much of the Elkhorn's 
flood prone-segment-from Neligh to the 
mouth-was rural, making basinwide improve-
ment inefficient. Furthermore, the corps specu-
lated that flood-proofing such regions would 
not encourage enough development of those 
areas to merit the expense of protecting them. 
Although the rural areas held rich agricul-
tural land and would incur high future flood 
damages, the corps deemed flood damages in 
those stretches too diffuse to justify the cost of 
basinwide flood control measures. But near 
towns and cities, flood control measures would 
provide the most concentrated benefits for the 
least expense. 29 
Addressing the proposed plans purely in 
terms of flood control, the comprehensive 
plans seemed to offer the best approach to 
minimizing flood damages along the Elkhorn. 
The logistics of drainage, runoff, and flooding 
within a river basin system would indicate that 
a piecemeal approach would fail or create prob-
lems in some areas as they are solved in others. 
The history of the Elkhorn's drainage districts 
confirms that. Successful reduction of flood 
damages along Logan Creek came from modi-
fying nearly the entire length of the creek and 
maintaining the improvements over time. In 
areas where only portions of streams were 
modified or where modifications were allowed 
to deteriorate, such as those along Rawhide 
Creek, results were less successful. Also, the 
demise of some drainage districts in a quag-
mire of litigation showed that saving one lo-
cation from flooding often meant harming 
another with increased runoff. 
Furthermore, flood studies show that a 
stream's floodplain should be treated as a com-
plete unit. Engineers now operate under the 
assumption that building within the floodplain 
increases flooding. Visualizing the floodplain 
as a paper cup aids in understanding this con-
cept. Under normal conditions the river flows 
within its banks, or the analogous paper cup is 
about half full of water. When the river floods, 
it fills its floodplain, going to the top of its 
natural channel, or the paper cup fills to the 
rim. But building in the floodplain displaces 
the river's normal flow, forcing floodwater out 
of the floodplain. Using the paper cup anal-
ogy, building in the flood plain has the same 
effect as if a person holding the cup squeezed 
it, thus forcing excess water to spill over the 
sides.30 That analogy illustrates the virtue of 
comprehensively isolating a river's floodplain, 
the true limits of the stream's channel, for the 
purposes of flood control. 
Environmentally speaking, treating the 
entire floodplain as a unit also makes sense. 
As the preceding discussion shows, encroach-
ment into a stream's floodplain forces flood 
flows higher than they would normally reach. 
Thus, humans not only subjected their struc-
tures in the flood plain to water damage but 
also extended damage to structures that oth-
erwise would have been beyond the natural 
floodplain. Aside from vacating the floodplain, 
which would appear to be out of the question 
given the amount of time and money invested 
in it, limiting human intrusion and giving the 
river its berth is a reasonable course. 
But politics and economics complicated 
the world into which the corps' recommen-
dations came. People had already intruded 
into the floodplain and for nearly a century 
had become ever more firmly entrenched and 
committed to remaining on the floodplain. 
To implement the comprehensive plans would 
require cooperation from a myriad oflocal gov-
ernments to gain rights-of-way and, in the cases 
of Plans C and D, uprooting two towns in toto. 
Implementation would also require allocating 
exorbitant sums of money for comparatively 
insignificant returns. The total cost of con-
structing PlanA would be $34,366,500; of Plan 
B, $29,198,800; of Plan C, $76,138,900; of 
Plan D, $84,478,200. Once constructed, the 
economic benefits of these projects would be 
exceeded by their maintenance costs.3! 
Given the complications associated with 
the comprehensive plans, local protection 
projects became the most economically and 
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politically attractive avenue to minimize flood 
damage. These projects were comparatively 
inexpensive and, in most cases, provided esti-
mated annual flood control benefits greater 
than their annual maintenance costs. Most 
important, these projects concentrated on 
small areas and protected concentrations of 
wealth and people-municipalitiesY 
In some cases, the local protection approach 
made cooperation easy to obtain when the 
corps presented its recommendations to basin 
residents at Fremont and Norfolk in Novem-
ber 1946 and in subsequent meetings with lo-
cal officials. Various city and county councils 
endorsed most of the local plans, which meant 
committing to provide land, rights-of-way, and 
easements at no cost to the federal govern-
ment, releasing the federal government from 
liability stemming from damages due to the 
construction work, agreeing to make neces-
sary alterations to highways and bridges af-
fected by the projects, and agreeing to maintain 
the projects after their completion.33 
Yet in other cases, the decision by local 
governments not to participate in the recom-
mended project indicated that more than eco-
nomics was involved. For example, the projects 
recommended for Buffalo Creek, Scribner, 
Hooper, and Winslow offered some of the most 
favorable cost-benefit ratios. The village board 
of Meadow Grove rejected the Buffalo Creek 
project because it could not obtain waivers 
from landowners along the creek who believed 
they might be injured if the project were com-
pleted. The reluctance of Meadow Grove's 
citizens to agree to the plan might come from 
their opinion that their flood troubles stemmed 
from highway and railroad embankments in-
terfering with Buffalo Creek's drainage. At the 
Norfolk flood damage hearing, Meadow 
Grove's mayor, Leonard Sanne, asked for a 
ditch to be cut through the embankments to 
allow water to drain on its natural course. With 
an apparently simple solution at hand, people 
in Meadow Grove likely thought the corps' 
proposal too elaborate. Scribner's city council 
simply felt its project was undesirable. Hooper's 
village board rejected the project slated for its 
jurisdiction because it feared high maintenance 
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costs and legal tangles that might result from 
the project's construction. Winslow sent the 
issue to its citizens, who rejected it because of 
its expense and the feeling that the project 
was unnecessary. 34 
Curbing flood damage in a piecemeal fash-
ion through local protection projects is less 
desirable for the environment than a compre-
hensive approach. It treats the floodplain nei-
ther as a unit nor a natural part of the river. 
This approach is inconsistent because it pro-
tects some areas of greater human wealth, yet 
leaves open to further injury areas of lesser 
human wealth. For the same reasons, it does 
not bode well for the natural mechanisms of 
the river and riparian lands and systems be-
cause water is artificially channeled in some 
places and not in others. Norfolk's city engi-
neer, H. H. Tracy, put it nicely when he testi-
fied at Norfolk that "in channel straightening 
there is no place in anyone locality to com-
mence work or to stop, as the entire river is a 
series of convolutions across county after 
county."J5 
While economically and politically expe-
dient, the local solutions epitomized the en-
vironmentally unsound, shortsighted use of 
technology condemned by historian Donald 
Worster. In his book Dust Bowl: The Southern 
Plains in the 1930s, Worster criticized inap-
propriately applied agricultural technology for 
exacerbating the Plains' natural drought cycle 
during the 1930s to create the Dust Bowl. The 
"ecological insensitivity of our culture," as 
Worster put it, was also at work in the develop-
ment of the Elkhorn Basin. To make matters 
worse, cultural insensitivity to the environ-
ment, at work from the beginning, may have 
been heightened by the involvement of the 
federal bureaucracies, which Worster describes 
as "innately anti-ecological" because they were 
"too insulated from the results of their actions 
to learn, to adjust, to harmonize."36 
In his recent study of California's rivers 
and how they have been changed by human 
activity, with a focus on flood control projects, 
Jeffrey F. Mount37 echoes these conclusions. 
During the same era the Elkhorn underwent 
piecemeal flood control modifications, a num-
ber of California rivers experienced similar 
treatments resulting from social and political 
processes very like those that occurred in Ne-
braska. This reflected the fact that although 
the Corps of Engineers has often stated a de-
sire to develop basin-based solutions to flood 
control and other river modifications, it has 
instead often pursued piecemeal approaches. 
Mount found that piecemeal approaches in 
California provided short-term local solutions, 
but created long-term basin-wide problems, 
including long-term costs that could have been 
avoided by adopting a basin based plan. He 
suggests that basin based solutions also adopt 
what might be termed gentler approaches. For 
instance, levees might be built farther from 
the river channel than has been the case so 
the river might continue to develop its natu-
ral equilibrium with the landscape. In the long 
run, he concludes, working with a river's natu-
ral processes this way reduces impact on the 
watershed and flood-related costs. 
Of the twelve local protection projects rec-
ommended by the corps, only six, those at 
Norfolk, Pierce, Giles Creek, Battle Creek, 
West Point, and Waterloo, met the dual crite-
ria of cost-effectiveness and local support that 
would lead the corps to recommend to Con-
gress that it assist residents in curbing floods 
and flood damage in the Elkhorn Basin, which 
the corps did in submitting its findings to the 
House of Representatives. Of these six projects, 
all or portions of five were eventually built. 
Construction began on the Norfolk project in 
May 1966 and was completed in December 
1968, the Pierce project was under construc-
tion from September 1963 to May 1964, West 
Point from June 1963 to June 1964, and Wa-
terloo from May 1966 to April 1967. The 
levees proposed for the Battle Creek project 
were abandoned in favor of 800 feet of riprap, 
completed in March 1973 along both banks of 
the creek to protect the embankments for the 
bridge on State Route 121. The federal gov-
ernment abandoned the Giles Creek project 
in November 1977. All or portions of two other 
local protection projects designed by the corps, 
but not recommended for construction, were 
later built: channel modifications to Buffalo 
Creek at Meadow Grove were completed in 
May 1973, and a levee around most of Hooper 
was finished in November 1966. Other corps 
projects in the basin include a stone embank-
ment to protect a bridge abutment on the 
Elkhorn River near Norfolk (completed May 
1973), channel enlargements to Union and 
Taylor Creeks near Madison (completed May 
1966), levees along Middle Fork Maple Creek 
near Clarkson (completed but date not avail-
able), a bank stabilization project on Logan 
Creek near Bancroft (completed February 
1972), and a 120-foot riprap on the Elkhorn's 
right bank to protect the Q Street bridge abut-
ment near Gretna {completed in February 
1972).38 
The most comprehensive, intensively re-
searched response to flooding in the basin's 
history, then, did not attempt to dominate the 
river. Rather, it limited action to defending 
areas of concentrated capital where local in-
terests would support the response. In light of 
the benefits of a comprehensive and coordi-
nated flood control plan, the hit-and-miss 
democratic application of the corps' recom-
mendations makes the response seem haphaz-
ard. Responses applied according to economic 
and political expedience limited manipulation 
of riparian lands but failed to treat the flood-
plain as a whole. In the short run, that may 
have been the best result for the river system 
and may have inadvertently prevented fur-
ther bureaucratic ecological insensitivity of 
the type Worster criticized. In the long run, it 
left the floodplain open to uncoordinated de-
velopment inconsistent with the floodplain 
and vulnerable to the cultural insensitivity 
about which Worster wrote. It would be years 
before government agencies would adopt a 
comprehensive approach to floodplain plan-
ning.39 Until that happened, the people got 
what they asked for. Whether the basin got 
what it needed remains to be seen. 
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